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ABSTRACT 
The dispute settlement regime between investors and states 
through ad hoc arbitration has come under heavy criticism in the 
past few decades. More recently, these critiques have escalated to 
the extent that the international community is considering 
replacing it with a completely new scheme that includes a 
permanent tribunal to settle such disputes. An intermediate 
approach to reforming the system²the establishment of an 
appellate body aimed at providing consistency to the numerous ad 
hoc arbitration awards²is also being considered. As a third 
option, the arbitration community, as well as other stakeholders 
interested in maintaining the ad hoc regime, are working to reform 
it by addressing only some of its flaws, while preserving its 
fundamental characteristics. This article analyzes the main 
criticisms of the current dispute settlement regime between 
investors and states and carries out a comparison between the three 
polic\ reform options, hoZ the\ are intended to solve the s\stem¶s 
flaws, as well as the implications arising from each of those 
options. 
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I. Introduction 
The current Investor-State Dispute Settlement System 
(ISDS) was created to allow foreign investors to bring claims 
directly against the states where the investors placed their 
investments. It began to provide foreign investors with a set of 
rules for resolving disputes in cases where the states hosting their 
investments do not comply with the terms of an international 
investment agreement (IIA). Its purpose is to protect foreign 
investors by providing them with an enforceable mechanism in the 
case of discrimination, expropriation, or any other restrictions of 
their rights under the IIA. Before the ISDS, disputes about foreign 
investment were settled either through domestic courts or 
diplomatic channels, Zhere the investor¶s state of citi]enship 
would bring a case against the state where the investment was 
located.3 
The first proposal for an ISDS, known as the Abs-Shawcross 
 
3 See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 Am. J. Int¶l LaZ 179 (2010). 
THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AMIDST CRISIS, COLLAPSE, 
AND REFORM 
 22 
Draft Convention, emerged during the late 1950s as a formulation 
from a group of European businesspersons and jurists, without any 
participation from governments.4 Among the main arguments in 
favor of the ISDS was the perception that a reliance on domestic 
systems would only hold merit in countries with sound legal 
systems, good governance, and effective local courts.5 Thus, from 
the investors¶ perspective, instead of settling foreign investment 
disputes before often biased and unsophisticated domestic courts in 
(developing) host states, most IIAs allowed them to move around 
the national courts of the host state to international arbitration 
proceedings.6  
Moreover, the ISDS safeguards the investors¶ interests in cases 
where political considerations in their home countries impede that 
state from confronting the state hosting the investment.7 From the 
point of vieZ of the investor¶s state, the mechanism prevents 
disputes concerning individuals from becoming a motive for 
divergence between sovereign states. From the perspective of the 
host states, the ISDS avoids possible retaliation from the investor¶s 
state, which could materialize even in areas outside the scope of 
the investment.  
This proposal, commonly portrayed as a mechanism to protect 
foreign investors, proved attractive to capital-exporting countries 
as it served as inspiration for the dispute settlement mechanism in 
the IIA, as prescribed by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).8 Ever since, this type of IIA 
has been presented to developing countries as a vehicle for 
 
4 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 72 (Oxford Univ.Press 2nd ed. 2012) 
(ebook). 
5 See Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, 2 
UNCTAD 1, 7 (2013) 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf. 
6 See Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos?: Foreign Investment Law as a 
Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 
ICSID REVIEW 372, 394 (2014). 
7 Id. 
8 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4. 
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attracting foreign investment. 
However, after almost six decades of existence, the correlation 
between Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), ISDS clauses and 
investment attraction is yet to be proven.9 Yet, the dramatic 
increase in the number of disputes involving investors and states 
leaves no room to doubt that the ISDS mechanism has served the 
alleged purpose of protecting investments.10 Nonetheless, the ISDS 
system has garnered numerous criticisms, as shown in the 
following section, and no longer forms a consensus, even among 
capital-exporting countries.  
The Emergence of a New Paradigm 
In the context of the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) proposed 
to address the ³fundamental and Zidespread lack of trust´ for the 
ISDS by introducing an Investment Court System (ICS) to resolve 
disputes between investors and states.11 Initially, the ICS was to be 
 
9 An extensive study recently conducted by the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment (CCSI) concluded that the ³evidence that investment treaties have 
the effect of increasing investment floZs is inconclusive´ and the ³common 
assumptions about the role of [bilateral investment treaties (BITs)] in attracting 
foreign investment are unsupported by a considerable amount of quantitative 
and qualitative evidence´. See Lise Johnson et al., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
STATES 6 (2018). See generally Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation, 2255 Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive (2007); Jason W. Yackee, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs 
Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC¶Y REV. 805-832 (2008).; 
Lauge Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and 
Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, Y.B. INT¶L INV. LAW & POL¶Y 
539-574 (2010); Joachim Pohl, Societal benefits and costs of International 
Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available empirical 
evidence, OECD Working Papers on Int¶l Inv. (2018). 
10 See KYLA TIENHAARA, Investor±State dispute settlement, REGULATORY 
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 676 (Peter Drahos, 2017). 
11 Cecilia Malmstrom, Proposing an Investment Court System European 
Commission (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en (last visited Mar 
16, 2018). 
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incorporated in bilateral agreements²as is already the case for the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU 
and Canada (CETA), and other treaties between the EU and 
Vietnam, Mexico, and Singapore. Eventually, the courts created 
under these agreements would be replaced by the Multilateral 
Investment Court (MIC). 
Discussions over ISDS reform are already ongoing in Working 
Group III (WG III) of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), whose mandate is 
separated into three phases, namely to: i) identify concerns 
regarding the ISDS;12 (ii) consider whether reform is desirable in 
light of any identified concerns;13 and if the Working Group 
concludes that reform is desirable, (iii) develop any relevant 
solutions to be recommended to the Commission.14  
As stated by the secretariat of WG III during its thirty fourth 
session in November 2017, the options for reform range from a 
minor adjustment of the existing ad hoc system to the creation of 
 
12 In the first phase of its mandate, the WG III concluded that the ³concerns 
commonly expressed about the existing ISDS regime include (i) inconsistency in 
arbitral decisions, (ii) limited mechanisms to ensure the correctness of arbitral 
decisions, (iii) lack of predictability, (iv) appointment of arbitrators by parties 
(³part\-appointment´), (v) the impact of part\-appointment on the impartiality 
and independence of arbitrators, (vi) lack of transparency, and (vii) increasing 
duration and costs of the procedure.´ Report of Working Group III (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-sixth session, 
UNCITRAL 1, 5, 7, 10, 16 (2018), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_
website.pdf (last visited Jan 16, 2019). 
13 As of the last session of its thirty-sixth session, the WG III concluded that a 
reform is desirable. From the thirty seventh session on, the WG III will address 
the relevant solutions to recommend to the commission. Report of Working 
Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-
sixth session, UNCITRAL (2018), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_
website.pdf (last visited Jan 16, 2019). Id. at 1, 8.  
14 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group 
III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform), UNCITRAL (2017), 1, 3 
https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/067/48/PDF/V1706748.pdf?OpenElement 
(last visited Jan 16, 2019). 
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an appellate body, or even establishing a permanent court to settle 
disputes regarding international investments.15  
The Establishment Strikes Back 
Concurrently, amid ongoing discussions held by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)²the Zorld¶s leading institution devoted to international 
investment dispute settlement²launched an amendment process 
and invited its Member States and the general public to suggest 
topics that merit consideration for reform. Among others, the list of 
topics for possible amendment envisages modifications that 
enhance transparency, access to justice, the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators, the consistency of awards, and the 
duration and cost-effectiveness of the proceedings.16 There are 
similarities between the list of concerns identified by UNCITRAL 
WG III and the topics for possible amendment from the ICSID, 
showing that reform is symptomatic and that the ICSID wants to 
address those concerns and improve its functioning before the 
crisis intensifies and more damages come to the fore. 
Three possible outcomes could arise from the abovementioned 
ISDS reform initiatives. The success of the ongoing WG III 
process could result in the creation of a permanent court, which 
would be a radical departure from the current ad hoc system.  
Extensive support for this prospective court would deliver a 
significant blow to the existing ISDS mechanism.17 In turn, the 
creation of an appellate mechanism responsible for reviewing the 
awards of ad hoc tribunals would represent an intermediate 
solution, where the ad hoc tribunals would maintain part of their 
adjudicatory authority, while transferring the other part to an 
appellate body. In the third scenario, an ICSID amendment process 
 
15 See Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform), UNCITRAL 1, 10-11 (2017), 
https://undocs.org/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142. 
16 See infra note 53. The complete list of areas for possible amendment is 
described in greater detail. 
17 The terms permanent court and International Court System (ICS) are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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would merely reform the ad hoc system, while maintaining its 
main characteristics. 
Each of these reform options presents different solutions to the 
current ISDS crisis. Consequently, each of them has its advantages 
and drawbacks. These three reform options affect the interests of 
stakeholders in different ways, namely investors, states, and the 
arbitration community. With the aim to assess the adequacy of the 
reform options in light of identified concerns, the next section of 
this paper will proceed with an analysis of the most commonly 
identified flaws of the ISDS. After that, it shifts to assessing the 
reform options and their likely outcomes, how they would affect 
ISDS proceedings, and hoZ the\ Zould address the s\stem¶s 
current challenges.  
II. The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Crisis 
While many of its benefits are still valid, the ISDS mechanism 
has presented several flaws that have raised questions about the 
system. Thus, many initiatives have emerged that aim to cope with 
some of the problems pointed out by commentators and 
practitioners of international investment law. Despite several 
changes to the IIAs and the arbitration institutions throughout the 
years, central flaws still remain.18 Some of these weaknesses cast 
doubt on the s\stem¶s abilit\ to attract investment or its capacit\ to 
benefit both investors and host countries in a sustainable way. 
Consequently, this section addresses the specific criticisms of the 
s\stem¶s capacit\ to conduct impartial and efficient procedures for 
the settlement of investment-related disputes. 
Same Facts, Similar Treaty Provisions ² Different Outcomes 
One of the main criticisms of ISDS proceedings is the 
inconsistency of arbitral decisions. The cases are judged by a 
variety of ad hoc tribunals, which is widely considered the 
characteristic that most impedes the consistency and interpretive 
continuity of case law. Therefore, ad hoc tribunals are intrinsically 
inadequate to ensure the consistency of a system of standards or 
the development of coherent case law. This is because its mission 
 
18 See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 408. 
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is to resolve specific cases in a manner that the parties concerned 
find satisfactory, irrespective of any contradictions within the 
consolidated understanding or the consequences it could have on 
future disputes.19 
Moreover, some legal standards, due to their level of 
abstraction, allow for different interpretations between arbitral 
courts. The lack of clarity of the provisions contained in 
investment agreements and the exponential increase in IIAs 
containing ISDS provisions have raised the risk of conflicting 
awards in parallel proceedings. This is because an investor 
established in multiple countries can claim breaches of the same 
IIA clause in any of their established countries and the state 
hosting their investment. Thus, investors can seek relief through 
multiple ad hoc tribunals for the same breach in a single 
investment, hoping that at least one tribunal will issue an award 
favorable to their interests.20  
Under this dynamic, a single dispute can lead to the 
undesirable situation for the international investment regime in 
which the same facts and the same treaty provision give rise to 
inconsistent arbitral decisions in different ad hoc tribunals.21 As a 
result, the inconsistency of decisions creates uncertainties about 
the meaning of key investment treaty provisions, leading to a lack 
of predictability as to how these provisions will be interpreted in 
the future. 
Many Flaws, Little Accountability 
Additionally, there are limited mechanisms to ensure the 
correctness of arbitral decisions, which prevent the system from 
overturning inconsistencies. ISDS awards are subject to revision or 
annulment in very limited cases under the ICSID Convention.22 
 
19 See Mark Feldman, Investment Arbitration Appellate Mechanism Options: 
Consistency, Accuracy, and Balance of Power, 32 ICSID REVIEW 1, 9, N.28 
(2017). 
20 See Roberts, supra note 3. 
21 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3. 
22 Post-Award Remedies - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Post-Award-Remedies-
Convention-Arbitration.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
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The only circumstance under which a revision can be required, as 
stated by Arbitration Rule (AR) 51(1) of the ICSID Convention, is 
the ³discover\ of some fact of such a nature as decisivel\ to affect 
the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact 
was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant and that the 
applicant¶s ignorance of that fact Zas not due to negligence.´23  
As for requests for annulment, AR 52(1) of the ICSID 
convention enumerates five circumstances for its application: a) 
improper constitution of the tribunal, b) excess of power, c) 
corruption, d) departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, and 
e) failure to state the reasons on which the award is based. 
Therefore, under the ICSID Convention, there is no possibility to 
annul or correct an award, even after having identified manifest 
errors of law. Furthermore, given that annulment committees are 
created on an ad hoc basis for the purpose of a single dispute, these 
may also arrive at inconsistent conclusions.24 
Party Appointment, Impartiality and Independence 
The party-appointment system is another issue that often 
receives criticism for being inherently contradictory to the 
obligation of arbitrators to be independent and impartial. The 
insufficiency of these standards under the ICSID has been 
identified as the cause of the numerous challenges placed against 
arbitrators in recent disputes,25 suggesting that disputing parties 
often perceive a bias or predisposition among arbitrators toward a 
specific outcome.26 The fact that parties do not appear to only 
choose arbitrators based on their experience and skills, but also 
based on whether the arbitrator enhances their chances of winning 
a case has given rise to a category of conflicts of interest known as 
³issue conflicts.´27 This refers to arbitrators who have repeatedly 
 
23 See ICSID, supra note 22. 
24 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
25 See Maria Nicole Cleis, The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID 
Arbitrators, ANALYSIS OF EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS 188 (2017) (eBook).  
26 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 4. 
27 See Cleis, supra note 24, at 191; see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn 
Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment 
Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 24 
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acted as arbitrators or counsels in cases that raised similar issues, 
alloZing the parties in the dispute to identif\ an arbitrator¶s 
propensity to decide a case according to their interests.  
One of the characteristics of the ISDS that promotes this ³issue 
conflict´ is the fact that most cases are judged b\ a small group of 
individuals, making it much easier for the parties to identify the 
arbitrators¶ positions. According to a stud\ conducted betZeen 
1972 and 2014, 419 different arbitrators sat on ICSID tribunals 
throughout that time.28 Although more than half of these arbitrators 
were appointed for only one case, 10 percent of them accounted for 
half of the appointments.29 Similar research found that 247 of the 
450 known ISDS disputes occurring in 2012 (not limited to ICSID) 
were decided by only 15 arbitrators.30 
Identifying the propensity of an arbitrator toward certain 
decisions is made easier by the fact that disputes over international 
investment agreements repeatedly address a limited and uniform 
number of legal provisions.31 In addition to the small group of 
professionals that act as arbitrators and the reduced number of 
uniform substantive rules discussed before arbitral tribunals, the 
fact that earlier arbitration decisions are often used as interpretive 
norms in subsequent cases further allows parties to foresee 
arbitrators¶ arguments for future cases.32 Therefore, by surveying 
awards issued by arbitrators in past cases, the parties in the dispute 
can foresee the position arbitrators are likely to adopt in a future 
case. 
As for the arbitrators, their impartiality is commonly 
questioned for having incentives to favor either investors or states 
 
(2012). 
28 Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 The European 
Journal of International Law 387, 403 (2014). 
29 Id. 
30 Pia Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice. How law firms, 
arbitrators and financiers are fueling an investment arbitration boom, 
CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY AND THE TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE 38 
(Helen Burley, 2012) (eBook). 
31 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A sequel, UNCTAD 96 (2014) 
(eBook). 
32 See Roberts, supra note 3. 
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in their decisions to ensure reappointment in future cases.33 They 
are also questioned for an act that could potentially constitute a 
conflict of interest, knoZn as ³double-hatting.´ This is Zhere an 
arbitrator also acts as an academic or a legal counsel in a different 
case. Indeed, their previous position when acting as a counsel, or 
their argument made in an academic paper, for example, could be a 
sign of a position they would be likely to defend in a future case.  
Opaque Proceedings, Low Legitimacy (Lack of Transparency)  
The lack of transparency of ISDS proceedings, with justice 
being administered ³behind closed doors,´ remains an important 
criticism levied against the current ISDS regime.34 Even though 
this issue has been the focus of some recent reforms, ISDS 
adjudicatory proceedings can still be kept fully confidential, even 
in cases that encompass issues of public interest.35 In order to 
allow for more transparent proceedings, commentators often 
suggest measures such as granting public access to arbitration 
documents and arbitral hearings, as well as allowing the 
participation of interested third-parties, such as civil society 
organizations.36 Such improvements would allow for public 
participation in the proceedings, which could enhance public 
understanding of the process and provide all ISDS parties with a 
greater understanding of the way arbitral tribunals interpret 
investment protection standards. 
Moreover, the lack of transparency, coupled with the 
accelerated development of international investment law 
jurisprudence, is considered a factor that prevent states from 
participating in ISDS disputes on an equal footing. The exponential 
proliferation of awards and the diffuse nature of the ad hoc system, 
which lacks an organized structure to classify decisions and 
identify the most important awards for jurisprudence purposes, 
make it difficult for states to stay up to date with relevant 
 
33 See Cleis, supra note 24, at 191-92. 
34 See UNCITRAL, supra note 14, at 12. 
35 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3. 
36 Rob Howse, Designing a Multilateral Investment Court: Issues and Options, 
36 Y.B. EUR. LAW 209, 235 (2017). 
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 31 
developments in ISDS jurisprudence. This task requires time and 
e[pertise. Ver\ often, it is not achieved, because of the states¶ 
limited bureaucratic resources and budget constraints.37 
Long Proceedings, High Costs, and Expensive Awards 
As emphasized in the previous paragraph, ISDS arbitration is 
getting progressively more complex and expensive, which in turn 
imposes serious barriers to the access to justice. Host countries 
have faced long-lasting cases with high-value claims and awards 
that were not expected when the system was created, casting doubt 
on the idea that arbitration is synonymous with a speedy and low-
cost method of dispute resolution.38 39  
Complexity of the cases and the open-ended nature of many of 
the legal issues in dispute lead to high costs and extended lengths 
of proceedings. Ultimately, this leads to the need to study 
numerous previous arbitral awards and other legal sources. Due to 
its complexity, investment arbitration is dominated by big law 
firms that mobilize large teams of lawyers, employ sophisticated 
techniques, and charge high fees for their services, further 
undermining access to the mechanism.40 
In fact, case law shows that filing and winning an investment 
claim takes time and requires a considerable amount of money. 
The average duration of an ICSID arbitration procedure typically 
takes three to four years.41 On average, the costs for each party in a 
single dispute surpasses $8 million,42 but can exceed $30 million in 
some cases.43 Australia, for example, is reported to have spent 
nearly $40 million on a recent dispute against a cigarette 
 
37 See Roberts, supra note 3. 
38 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 4. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, ICSID 898 (Aug. 2, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with ICSID).  
42 See David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers 
on International Investment 24 (2012). 
43 See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 19. 
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company.44  
Arbitrators¶ fees alone cost, on average, $700,000,45 which is 
estimated to represent just 16 percent of the total cost of arbitration 
proceedings.46 Legal counsel represents the largest cost component 
to the parties which are estimated to represent, on average, 
82 percent of the total arbitration cost. Meanwhile, institutional 
costs payable to organizations that administer the arbitration 
process amount to about 2 percent of the total.47  
Therefore, it is understandable that certain respondent States 
may struggle to come up with the significant resources required to 
properly defend themselves in the current ISDS system.48 At the 
same time, the average cost for arbitration in the ICSID and the 
average time for the conclusion of a case are also a concern for 
investors with limited resources, especially small and medium 
ones.49 In that sense, the ISDS mechanism, despite allowing 
foreign investors to have direct access to international arbitration, 
could be considered an ineffective regime that only protects the 
wealthiest investors, since only a few could be able to take 
advantage of it.50 
Other elements that exacerbate the mechanism¶s flaZs are the 
high-value claims and expensive awards verified in arbitral 
proceedings. Many ISDS claims now exceed $1 billion,51 and have 
reached $114 billion,52 which would present a challenge to the 
public finances of any country, let alone developing ones.53 
 
 
44 See id. 
45 See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 394. 
46 See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 19. 
47 See id. 
48 See Howse, supra note 35, at 231. 
49 See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 380. 
50 See id.  
51 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10, at 683. 
52 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3. 
53 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10, at 686. 
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III. The Proposals to Reform the ISDS 
Notwithstanding the long-standing criticism over the ad hoc 
ISDS the best way to address the current crisis remains unclear. 
There are three main courses of action being considered. One is the 
creation of an ICS, which is the most radical departure from the 
current system and is being voiced by the EU and its allies. It 
envisages the comprehensive replacement of the current system 
with a two-tier permanent court made up of functionally 
independent judges with fixed terms. An intermediate approach is 
the simple establishment of an appellate body aimed at enhancing 
the consistency of the decisions issued by the arbitral tribunals, 
while maintaining the core principles of the ad hoc system. Finally, 
the third course of action would be the adoption of incremental 
modifications to the current system in order to address the main 
concerns that have been voiced against it, all while maintaining its 
main characteristics.54 
 
54 The division proposed in this article is envisaged to better assess the current 
initiatives to reform the ISDS. It differs significantly from the authors who 
analyze the issue under the criteria of depth of the reform, for whom the reform 
of the ISDS is divided in three main camps: ³1. Incrementalists view the 
criticisms of the current system as overblown and argue that Investor-State 
arbitration remains the best option available. Hence, they favor retaining the 
existing dispute resolution system but instituting modest reforms that would 
redress specific concerns. 2. Systemic reformers see merit in retaining investors¶ 
ability to file claims directly on the international level, but view Investor-State 
arbitration as a seriously flawed system for dealing with such claims. They 
champion more significant, systemic reforms, such as replacing Investor-State 
arbitration with a MIC and appellate body. 3. Paradigm shifters dismiss the 
existing system as irrevocably flawed and in need of wholesale replacement. 
They reject the utilit\ of investors¶ making international claims against states, 
whether before arbitral tribunals or international courts. They embrace a variety 
of alternatives, such as domestic courts, ombudsmen, and State-to-State 
arbitration.´ Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform 
of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 Am. J. Int¶l LaZ 1 (2018). See also Sergio 
Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the 
Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT¶L LAW 361, (2018). at 363. They 
classify the changes under the criteria of institutional alternatives for resolving 
investment disputes, such as negotiation and mediation; domestic dispute 
settlement mechanisms such as courts, specialized processes and ombudsman 
offices; independent interstate adjudicatory mechanisms such as ad hoc tribunals 
and international courts; and international adjudicatory mechanisms as 
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a.  The International Court System  
The EU has championed the idea of a permanent court. The 
majority of EU countries have traditionally been enthusiastic 
participants of the system. In 2014, however, while reacting to a 
public consultation55 on investment protection amid growing 
concerns over the ISDS in the context of the TTIP negotiations, the 
Europeans came to advocate for a permanent court to settle 
disputes between investors and states, first for the TTIP and later 
for other trade agreements.56 Even though the TTIP negotiations 
ended in 2017, the EU managed to implement a permanent 
investment court in its bilateral agreements with Canada,57 
Vietnam (EU-Vietnam FTA),58 Singapore (EU-Singapore FTA),59 
and Mexico (EU-Mexico FTA).60 In 2017, UNCITRAL entrusted 
its WG III with a mandate to work on a possible reform of the 
ISDS. One of the reform options being considered by WG III is the 
creation of a permanent court, whose arbitrators would be tasked 
with resolving ISDS cases that fall under its jurisdiction.61 WG III 
has identified several concerns with the current ISDS system. In 
the next section, we analyze how a permanent court would be 
likely to address those concerns. 
 
 
complementary, which include the international review of domestic decisions, 
international claims after domestic proceedings and interpretation at the request 
of national courts. 
55 See Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP), European Commission 25 (Jan. 13, 2015) (on file with 
European Commission). 
56 The Multilateral Investment Court project, European Commission (Dec. 21, 
2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 (last visited Jan 
23, 2019). 
57 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Oct. 30, 2016. 
58 EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, EU-Viet, 2018. 
59 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of 
Singapore, EU-Sing, Oct. 19, 218.  
60 EU-Mexico Trade Agreement, EU-Mex., Apr. 21, 2018. 
61 See UNCITRAL, supra note 15. 
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i. The ICS and the Shortcomings of the ISDS 
Ensuring the Consistency and Predictability of Tribunal 
Awards 
Champions of the ICS argue that a permanent court would 
address the ISDS concerns in many ways. As for the lack of 
consistency, predictability, and certainty of tribunal awards, its 
advocates state that a consistent jurisprudence can only arise when 
the parties are obligated to use the same court for the settlement of 
various disputes. A permanent tribunal would thus ensure the 
performance of a fixed group of judges for a certain period of time, 
as well as the opportunity for interaction on a repeated basis, which 
could potentially reinforce the consistency and coherence of 
awards.62 
A standing body of jurists²who repeatedly examine a large 
number of cases and capture the evolution of the doctrine²would 
likely be in a privileged position to construct a stable jurisprudence 
based on precedent case law, thus enhancing the predictability of 
the system as a whole.63 Moreover, two key characteristics of 
permanent courts²the exclusive dedication and repeated 
interactions of its members²provide for a higher level of 
engagement and a greater responsibility as an institution, which 
tends to circumscribe their actuation under the constitutive 
instruments of the body,64 thus preventing undesirable outcomes, 
such as the emergence of inconsistent case law. Besides that, a 
permanent court, by accumulating the competence over a high 
number of cases, can enact provisions that consolidate parallel 
proceedings to avoid different outcomes arising from similar 
facts.65 
 
62 See Feldman, supra note 19, at 9. 
63 See Howse, supra note 35, at 226. 
64 See Feldman, supra note 19. 
65 See Article 8.43 - Consolidation (CETA), Lewik, 
https://www.lewik.org/term/11197/article-843-consolidation-ceta/ 
(Last visited Nov. 3, 2019) ³When tZo or more claims that have been submitted 
separately pursuant to Article 8.23 have a question of law or fact in common and 
arise out of the same events or circumstances, a disputing party or the disputing 
parties, jointly, may seek the establishment of a separate division of the Tribunal 
pursuant to this Article and request that such division issue a consolidation order 
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The abovementioned improvement carries an important side 
effect with it: the more consistent and predictable the system is, the 
more prepared the states will be to self-regulate in a way that 
avoids future disputes. Consequently, there would be a reduction in 
the so-called ³chilling effect´66 on new regulations that pursue 
public policy objectives, given that members would be more aware 
of their regulatory boundaries than they are today. The final result 
would be more investment and better-designed public policy 
measures. 
More Mechanisms to Pursue the Correctness of Awards  
Apart from enhancing consistency, the ICS proposal also aims 
to provide additional alternatives to ensure the correctness of 
arbitral awards. As emphasized in the previous section, the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules provide very few possibilities for the revision 
and annulment of arbitral awards, possible only on the grounds of 
serious events.67 Proponents of the ICS advocate for more 
alternatives to revise awards in the event of procedural or 
substantial errors of law, including the re-examination of the case 
 
(³request for consolidation´).´ See also supra note 57, at 75. Article 3.59.1: ³In 
case that two or more claims submitted under this Section have a question of law 
or fact in common and arise out of the same events and circumstances, the 
respondent may submit to the President of the Tribunal a request for the 
consolidation of such claims or part thereof.´ 
66 See Howse, supra note 35, at 235 ³« Zhich invites regulator\ chill, leading 
to uncertainty 
about the policy space available for States to pursue legitimate regulatory 
objectives 
in the public interest.´. 
67 See ICSID Convention, supra note 22. The only circumstance under which a 
revision can be required, as stated by the Arbitration Rule 51 of the ICSID 
convention: [a] party can apply for revision of the award if it discovers a new 
fact that could decisively affect that award (Article 51 of the ICSID Convention, 
Arbitration Rules 50, 51, 53 and 54). The new fact must have been unknown to 
the Tribunal and the applicant Zhen the aZard Zas rendered, and the applicant¶s 
ignorance of the fact cannot be due to negligence.´ As for requests of 
annulment, Arbitration Rule 52 enumerates five circumstances: a) improper 
constitution of the tribunal, b) excess of power, c) corruption, d) departure from 
a fundamental rule of procedure and e) failure to state the reasons on which the 
award is based. 
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by conducting a comprehensive and fresh analysis of the facts or a 
limited analysis through checking manifest errors in the 
appreciation of facts.68 Therefore, it seems clear that the ICS 
proposal, encompassing a double-tiered tribunal with an appellate 
body entrusted with the responsibility of reviewing first-instance 
awards, would provide a greater possibility of ensuring the 
integrity of the decisions. 
Part\ Appointment Affecting Arbitrators¶ Independence and 
Impartiality 
A permanent tribunal is also likely to address the concerns over 
the lack of independence and impartiality resulting from the party 
appointment of arbitrators on ISDS ad hoc tribunals. Establishing 
an objective criterion to appoint judges to cases, which would 
replace the party-appointment system, is already an important step 
towards adjudicative impartiality.69 Adjudicators that do not rely 
on parties to appoint them to a case will naturally enjoy more 
autonom\ to decide the cases, independentl\ of parties¶ interests.  
Besides that, by maintaining a permanent body of adjudicators 
that is also financially independent from investors¶ influence, the 
ICS would be in a better position to implement an ambitious code 
of conduct that prohibits arbitrators from acting as a counsel in 
pending or new investment disputes, as well as from being 
assigned to cases that would create direct or indirect conflicts of 
interest.70 Indeed, it is difficult to envisage such a strict code of 
 
68 See Commission staff working document impact assessment. Multilateral 
reform of investment dispute resolution, European Union 11 (2017), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0302 (last visited 
Jan 23, 2019). 
69 See supra note 25, 2011-21; see also Howse, supra note at 235. 
70 Some provisions in this regard are already in place in some agreements 
negotiated by the EU. See  
Article 8.30.1 - Consolidation (CETA), Lewik, 
https://www.lewik.org/term/11183/article-830-ethics-ceta/ (Last visited Nov. 3, 
2019), which prohibits adjudicators from acting as counsel or as a party-
appointed expert or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under 
CETA or any other international agreement²a rule that does not exist in the 
ICSID convention. The same article also impedes members of the tribunal from 
being affiliated with any government, from taking instructions from any 
organization or government with regard to matters related to the dispute, and 
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conduct in the current ISDS, where arbitrators have no assurance 
of future income and are thus compelled to find other sources of 
income. Since those individuals have considerable knowledge 
about international investment dispute resolution, they naturally 
tend to use their expertise by acting in other positions in ISDS 
cases.  
Transparency 
Given that ³the concern over lack of transparenc\ or justice 
being administered behind closed doors remains an important 
criticism levied against the current ISDS regime,´71 it is expected 
that the prospective ICS is likely to address the issue of 
transparency. Demands for greater transparency in investment 
dispute proceedings include the possibility of non-party 
intervention (amicus curiae briefs), disclosure of documents and 
information from the proceedings, as well as publicly accessible 
hearings.72  
One indication that the procedural rules of the prospective ICS 
would focus heavily on the issue of transparency comes from the 
permanent investment courts established in the new agreements 
that the EU recently negotiated with Canada, Vietnam, Singapore, 
and Mexico. By incorporating the UNCITRAL Transparency 
Rules²with some modifications²these agreements require that 
the hearings, written submissions, tribunal awards, and the relevant 
documents of the dispute be open to the public, unless there is a 
need to protect confidential and sensible information. Moreover, 
the transparency provisions of those agreements allow for amicus 
curiae briefs, stipulating the circumstances under which non-
disputing parties can participate in the proceedings.73  
Apart from granting a greater level of transparency, the 
 
from participating in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct 
or indirect conflict of interest. See also Article 3.40.1 supra note 57 at 53. 
71 UNCITRAL 2017, supra note 15, at 7. 
72 See Howse, supra note 35, at 235. 
73 Transparency provisions are placed on the article 8.36 of the CETA; article 46 
of the Dispute Settlement Chapter of EU-Vietnam FTA, and article 19 of EU-
Mexico FTA, and annex 8 of the EU-Singapore FTA. 
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 39 
incorporation of those rules by permitting the oversight of the 
proceedings, would allow for a greater understanding of the 
adjudicators¶ judgments. It could represent a paradigmatic shift 
from a system where case law evolves without proper awareness to 
one where the relevant stakeholders would be able to better assess 
the prevailing understandings and doctrines regarding the language 
of IIAs, thus improving the consistency and predictability of the 
system.  
Reducing the Costs and Duration of Proceedings: The Issue of 
Access to Justice 
The high costs and excessive duration of the proceedings are 
emphasized by UNCITRAL WG III as the main concerns of the 
ISDS and are addressed in the ICS. ISDS costs are constructed of 
fees paid to arbitrators, administrative fees charged by arbitral 
institutions and fees paid by the parties to their counsels for legal 
representation and for experts.74 As highlighted in the previous 
section, the lion¶s share of ISDS costs are spent on legal counsel,75 
whereas costs for arbitrators and tribunal fees constitute only a 
small portion of it.76 Thus, ISDS tribunal proceedings entail very 
low overhead costs.77 A permanent court, on the other hand, would 
require permanent funding to cover the salary of its permanent 
bod\ of adjudicators, as Zell as the maintenance of the tribunal¶s 
structure.  
This rationale could lead to the conclusion that an ICS would 
increase ISDS costs. However, it is reasonable to assume that the 
standardization of adjudication procedures would bring efficiency 
to dispute resolution and make it less time-consuming. This would 
 
74 See supra note 14, at 9-10. 
75 See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 15. 
76 See Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Damages and costs in investment 
treaty arbitration revisited, THE INT¶L J. COM. TREATY ARB. (2017), 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151755/damages-and-costs-in-
investment-treaty-arbitration-revisited (last visited Jan 23, 2019). The authors 
conclude that the sum of costs paid to legal counsel and experts ($10.9 million) 
is approximately 9.85 times greater than the average tribunal cost ($1.1 million).  
77 See Joerg Risse, A new "investment court system" Reasonable Proposal or 
Nonstarter?,  Global Arbitration News (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/investment-court-system-20150925. 
THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AMIDST CRISIS, COLLAPSE, 
AND REFORM 
 40 
presumably lead to a reduction in the hours worked by experts and 
legal counsel, thus decreasing the overall money spent on the 
largest cost component of the ISDS.78 A more consistent 
jurisprudence can reduce discrepancies among the value of awards, 
bringing more certainty to how much parties are expected to spend 
to bring a case before an investment tribunal.  
Furthermore, an ICS, by concentrating numerous disputes in 
the same adjudicative body, would increase the economies of scale 
by consolidating the various claims that have arisen from the same 
circumstance. Take, as an e[ample, Argentina¶s response to its 
financial crises, which generated several disputes with investors 
from different countries, even though the background and the 
causes of the claims were the same.79 In such a case, ad hoc 
tribunals are likely to spend time and energy on each individual 
claim under a different tribunal, whereas an ICS could consolidate 
those claims, thus sparing important resources. 
Moreover, the ICS would also permit the elaboration of a 
scheme envisaged to reduce the burden that some users currently 
face in filing a claim for international investment arbitration. While 
a permanent court would require permanent funding to cover 
overhead costs, these could be favorably allocated to certain 
categories of economically disadvantaged users²taking into 
consideration their capacit\ to cover the tribunal¶s costs. Under 
such mechanism, both developing countries and small and medium 
enterprises would benefit. 
A more predictable s\stem also tends to reduce the parties¶ 
expenses on legal counsel and experts. The lack of a rule of 
binding precedent may place a burden on parties and their legal 
counsels to submit all available arguments, irrespective of whether 
those arguments have been accepted or rejected by earlier 
tribunals.80 The fact that many legal issues remain unsettled 
 
78 See Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New 
(and Improved?) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, COLUMB. J. 
TRANSNAT¶L L., 178, 199 (2016). 
79 See Howse, supra note 35. 
80 See Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) 
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imposes the necessity on legal counsel and experts to invest 
extensive resources into studying numerous previous arbitral wards 
in order to develop a legal position.81 Ultimately, all these costs are 
borne by the parties of the ISDS disputes. 
ICS and the Balance of Power  
In addition to the points debated above, an ICS would be in a 
better position to fix the opposing forces that currently threaten the 
equilibrium of disputes between investors and states. The vague 
wording of existing IIAs82 allow adjudicators to make overly broad 
interpretations, while the ad hoc nature of the ISDS system allows 
the parties to choose arbitrators who are more susceptible to 
deciding the case according to their interests.83 This combination 
exacerbates the risk of an asymmetrical power balance between 
investors and states. This risk is especially high in disputes 
involving billionaire multinational companies that are able to 
devote considerable financial resources to elite arbitrators/counsel 
who are anchored in commercial law firms.84 Moreover, the lack of 
mechanisms to oversee such risks enhances the widespread 
sentiment of distrust in the ISDS.85 Therefore, the settlement of 
disputes in a more institutionalized regime would provide greater 
levels of independence and create control mechanisms that, in turn, 
would reduce the risks of adjudicators exceeding their mandates. 
ii. Trade-offs and Practical Difficulties of the ICS 
The shift from the ad hoc ISDS to an ICS implies certain costs 
and drawbacks that do not exist under the current system. A 
permanent court would result in overhead costs to maintain its 
physical facilities, along with the necessity to pay the salaries of a 
 
on the work of its thirty-fourth session, supra note 72, at 8. 
81 See UNCTAD, supra note 5. 
82 Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire 
Strikes Back, 43 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 56 (2001), 
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/165 (last visited Jan 23, 2019). He 
argues that the inclusion of intentionall\ vague terms in IIAs are ³designed to 
give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules 
necessar\ to achieve the treat\¶s object and purpose in particular disputes.´ 
83 See Schweider, supra note 76. 
84 See Howse, supra note 35. 
85 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10. 
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standing body of judges²costs that do not currently exist. Another 
negative aspect of an ICS would be the lack of finality that could 
result from the adoption of an appellate mechanism. Advocates of 
this argument opine that the great merits of arbitration²its speed 
and finality²would eventually be undermined in an appeals 
system that would likely be frequently invoked.86 While this 
criticism merits consideration, it is worth recalling that an appellate 
body has the function of ensuring the correctness of award 
decisions and enhancing the legitimacy of the system. Moreover, 
the extra costs and delays that may arise from an ICS can be 
compensated and even surpassed by the gains of scale and 
efficiency achieved through a greater standardization of 
procedures, as addressed in the previous section. 
The ICS also faces criticism over the practical difficulties of its 
implementation. First, the highly diverse universe of more than 
3,000 international investment agreements, each with their 
different wordings and negotiation histories, would add a high 
degree of complexity to the operation of the court, especially in the 
development of consistent jurisprudence.87 Other issues include the 
lack of specialized personnel that would form the pool of 
arbitrators of the ICS, its ability to select high-quality judges,88 and 
whether they would really be any different from the experts who 
regularly intervene in Investor-State arbitrations.89 Furthermore, as 
 
86 See Michael Wood, Choosing between Arbitration and a Permanent Court: 
Lessons from Inter-State Cases, 32 ICSID REVIEW 1-16 (2017). See also 
Feldman, supra note 19. 
87 See Howse, supra note 35. 
88 See Wood, supra note 84. 
89 Nikos Lavranos, The ShoUWcomingV of Whe PUopoVal foU an ³InWeUnaWional 
CoXUW S\VWem´ (ICS) EFILA Blog (2016), https://efilablog.org/2016/02/02/the-
shortcomings-of-the-proposal-for-an-international-court-system-ics/ (last visited 
Jan 23, 2019). ³Apart from this danger, it remains doubtful whether a sufficient 
number of appropriately qualified individuals with the necessary expertise can 
be found. This is particularly true since many professionals currently working in 
arbitration may be excluded on the basis that they could be considered to be 
biased. The pool of TFI and AT judges would seem to be limited to academics, 
(former) judges and (former) Governmental officials. That might not be 
sufficient to guarantee the practical experience and expertise needed and/or 
independence from the State.´   
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is frequently invoked by the arbitration industry, the party-
appointment system has the effect of enhancing investor trust in 
the ISDS. Therefore, in such a system where only the states would 
be able to establish arbitrators, the investors¶ trust in the s\stem 
could be undermined.90 
Although this shift would certainly bring several collateral 
effects, as is the case for any paradigm shift, its consequences 
should not be appraised individually, since they could be 
compensated by other advantages. Indeed, case studies show that 
most ISDS cases deal with only a few disciplines, with similar 
wordings, contradicting the affirmation that the more than 3,000 
IIAs would make it difficult for an ICS to develop consistent 
jurisprudence.  
Even though it may be true that there might be a shortage of 
individuals in the pool of arbitrators in the first years after the 
implementation of an ICS, its implementation is likely to generate, 
throughout the years, the specialized personnel required for its 
proper functioning. As for the overhead costs that would be created 
by an ICS, it is reasonable to assume that the gains of scale caused 
by the consolidation of multiple cases under a single tribunal 
would equal or even surpass this burden. Likewise, investor 
distrust arising from the elimination of party appointment would be 
compensated through improving the consistency and the 
predictability of the system as a whole. 
b. Appeals Mechanism 
The creation of an appeals mechanism would represent an 
intermediate reform of the international investment dispute 
resolution mechanism by creating a standing body of jurists with 
the competence to review decisions of the arbitral tribunals, while 
maintaining the functioning dynamics of the ad hoc system²in 
keeping with the interests of the arbitration industry. This reform 
option is envisaged to address some of the most common concerns 
over the ISDS, which were already addressed in the previous 
 
90 Id. ³The pre-selection of the TFI and AT judges by the Contracting Parties 
carries the inherent risk of selecting µpro-State¶ individuals, in particular since 
the\ are paid b\ the States (or rather their ta[ pa\ers) alone.´  
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sections. These include the lack of mechanisms to ensure the 
correctness of tribunal awards, as well as a lack of consistency and 
predictability in the system. On the other hand, it does not tackle 
other issues, such as the impact of party appointment on the 
impartiality and independence of arbitrators and the lack of 
transparency.  
The idea of the creation of an appellate body in the ICSID 
emerged within the last decade. Similar schemes were effectively 
negotiated in some regional agreements²mainly by the United 
States with the Dominican Republic and Central America 
(CAFTA-DR), Singapore, Peru, Morocco, Korea, and Chile.91 
Apart from the e[amples coming from the US, India¶s neZest 
generation of BITs also indicates an openness to a future appellate 
mechanism.92  
In 2004, the ICSID discussed the implementation of an appeals 
mechanism in a discussion paper on possible improvements to the 
investment arbitration framework.93 More recently, this option 
resurged in discussions on the reform of the international 
investment regime as a means to achieve greater consistency, 
coherence, and predictability in investment arbitration case law,94 
and it is frequently suggested even by the arbitration community.95 
 
91 Although an appeals facility was negotiated on these IIAs, they were never 
implemented. 
92 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Policy Hub 
(2015), https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560 (last 
visited Dec 02, 2018). ³Article 29. Appeals Facility. The Parties may by 
agreement or after the completion of their respective procedures regarding the 
enforcement of this Treaty may establish an institutional mechanism to develop 
an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by 
tribunals.´  
93 Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 
Icsid.worldbank.org (2004), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements
%20of%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf (last visited 
Feb 3, 2019). 
94 See Feldman, supra note 19. See also Elsa Sardinha, The Impetus for the 
Creation of an Appellate Mechanism, 32 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 503-527 (2017). 
95 See Nikos Lavranos, supra note 87. The European Federation for Investment 
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 45 
The EU also intends for its prospective MIC to possibly serve as 
the appeals mechanism for some countries that might prefer to 
settle their investment disputes within the current ad hoc system, 
but nevertheless might want the opportunity to review the 
decisions it issues. In a paper submitted to WG III in January 2019, 
where the EU outlines its proposal to establish a permanent 
Multilateral Investment Court, it proposes an open architecture 
scheme that ensures a certain level of flexibility to accommodate 
the interests of such countries.96 
Theoretically, the establishment of an appeals mechanism 
would have the advantage of addressing some of the main concerns 
over the ISDS, while avoiding the abovementioned practical 
difficulties of an ICS and resistance from stakeholders interested in 
maintaining the status quo. Moreover, it would provide an 
alternative way to ensure the correctness of arbitral awards and 
promote the emergence of a consistent set of rules through the 
repeated examination of similar cases by a permanent group of 
judges, which is only possible when parties are required to use the 
same tribunal for dispute resolution.97 By promoting consistency 
and predictability, and reducing the risks of conflicting decisions, 
an appellate mechanism could restore faith in the ISDS, thus 
enhancing its legitimacy and sustainability over the long term. 
Whereas an appeals mechanism would maintain some of the 
main features of the ad hoc regime, it would drastically change 
other characteristics that have been portrayed as big advantages of 
the current ISDS. While appellate review could provide an 
alternative way of ensuring the integrity of arbitral awards, it could 
also severely undermine some of the great merits of the current 
 
Law and Arbitration (EFILA), reacting to the European proposal to establish an 
ICS during the TTIP negotiations, suggested that ³the US and the EU should 
also consider whether it would not be more preferable to modify and Improve 
existing systems, such as turning the ICSID annulment procedure into a full 
appeal mechanism.´ 
96 Submission establishing a standing mechanism for the settlement of 
international investment disputes, Trade.ec.europa.eu, at 9 (2019), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157631.htm (last visited Feb 11, 2019). 
97 See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International 
Tribunals, 93 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, at 24 (2005). 
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ISDS, which are efficiency and finality.98 Besides that, as 
emphasized in the previous section, it is expected that parties 
would face extra costs and more delays in an appeals system, as it 
is reasonable to assume that it would be frequently invoked by the 
losing parties.  
c. ICSID Reform²The Establishment Strikes Back 
The ICSID was established in 1966 and is the Zorld¶s leading 
institution dedicated to international investment dispute settlement, 
having administered the majority of all international investment 
disputes, which amounts to more than 600 cases to date.99 The 
ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules are frequently subject 
to improvements and have already been amended to address 
concerns over transparency, independence, the impartiality of 
arbitrators, and time effectiveness.100 
In the realm of the current ISDS crisis, the ICSID Secretariat 
initiated consultations in late 2016 with its Member States and the 
general public to identify areas where further reform might be 
needed. A similar invitation was issued to the public in early 2017. 
This marks the fourth rule-amendment process and is the most 
extensive review to date.101 The stated goals of this review are to 
modernize, simplify and streamline the rules, while also reducing 
the environmental footprint of ICSID proceedings. However, the 
process of consultation with Member States and the public resulted 
in 16 areas for potential amendments, which coincide with several 
areas for possible improvement already identified by UNCITRAL 
 
98 See Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does Investor-
State Arbitration Need an Appellate System, 7 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE 
PRACTICE AND PROCESS, AT 298 (2005), 
http://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol7/iss2/9 (last visited 
Jan 25, 2019). 
99 See ICSID, Icsid.worldbank.org (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited Jan 25, 
2019). 
100 ICSID Amendments, Icsid.worldbank.org (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Pages/About/about.aspx (last visited 
Jan 25, 2019). 
101 Id. 
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WG III.102  
The EU¶s proposal to establish a tZo-tier tribunal with a 
permanent body of adjudicators and an appellate body is a radical 
departure from the existing ISDS regime. The creation of such a 
tribunal, with a significant support among states, would be a major 
threat to the ICSID¶s e[istence.103 Therefore, the launch of such an 
extensive review process by the ICSID seems to indicate that the 
ICSID Secretariat is concerned about a radical reshaping of the 
ISDS regime that could be harmful to its own existence. It is also 
an indication that the ICSID is not willing to participate in the 
EU¶s initiative. Instead, such an initiative shows that the ICSID 
 
102 List of Topics for Potential ICSID Rule Amendment, Icsid.worldbank.org 
(2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/List of Topics for 
Potential ICSID Rule Amendment-ENG.pdf (last visited Jan 25, 2019). The 
potential areas for amendment of ICSID rules are: 1. Review Procedure for 
Appointment and Disqualification of Arbitrators, Explore Feasibility of Code of 
Conduct for Arbitrators, 2. Clarify Rules on Preliminary Objections and 
Bifurcation 3. Explore Possible Provisions on Consolidation of Proceedings and 
Parallel Proceedings 4. Modernize Institution Rules, Means of Communications 
and Filing of Briefs and Supporting Documentation, and General Functions of 
the Secretariat 5. Modernize and Simplify Rules concerning the First Session, 
Procedural Consultation and Pre-Hearing Conference 6. Modernize Rules on 
Witnesses and Experts and Other Evidence 7. Explore Possible Provisions for 
Suspension of Proceedings and Clarify Rules on Discontinuance when Parties 
Fail to Act 8. Reflect Best Practices for Preparation of Award, Separate and 
Dissenting Opinions 9. Explore Presumption in Favor of Allocating Costs to the 
Prevailing party, Possible Provisions on Security for Costs and Security for Stay 
of Enforcement of Awards 10. Review Provisions on Provisional Measures 11. 
Clarify and Streamline Procedure in Annulment Proceedings 12. Review and 
Modernize Provisions on Costs, Fees and Payment of Advances, and 
Discontinuance for Failure to Pay Advances 13. Explore Possible Provisions on 
Transparency, Clarify Rules on Non-Disputing party Participation 14. Improve 
Time and Cost Efficiency and Explore Feasibility of Guide for Efficient 
Conduct of Process 15. Explore Possible Provisions on Third party Funding 16. 
Streamline Additional Facility Rules for Non-ICSID Convention Cases. 
103 NotZithstanding the natural outcome of the ICS¶s success being the decline 
in ICSID¶s membership, there are still legal options for the ICSID to participate 
in the EU¶s initiative, either b\ providing administrative support, serving as a 
forum for negotiations, or even serving as the organization onto which the new 
mechanism might be docked. See N. Jansen Calamita, The Challenge of 
Establishing a Multilateral Investment Tribunal at ICSID, 32 ICSID REVIEW 
611-624 (2017). 
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strives for the continuity of the current regime and aims to solve 
the concerns that gave rise to dissatisfaction with the ISDS.  
ICSID¶s Effort to ImproYe Consistenc\ 
Much has been discussed about the ability of ad hoc tribunals 
to enhance the consistency of awards. Despite ICSID tribunals 
using ad hoc arbitration to settle international investment disputes 
on the basis of heterogeneous treaty provisions, there is a tendency 
among ICSID tribunals to develop a homogeneous methodology 
regarding international law.104 However, ICSID could do 
significantly more to enhance the consistency of the awards issued 
by its numerous tribunals.105 
In the current amendment process, ICSID is innovating by 
introducing options for the consolidation and coordination of 
claims.106 The consolidation proceedings include the appointment 
of the same arbitrators to hear otherwise separate cases, organizing 
joint hearings, or ensuring that the awards are rendered 
simultaneously. The consolidation of claims tends to reduce the 
costs of proceedings and improve the consistency of the awards in 
cases where the background of the disputes is identical or similar. 
This novelty in the ICSID Arbitration Rules replicates some 
provisions on the consolidation and coordination of claims already 
in place for the permanent courts recently negotiated by the 
European Union.107  
Moreover, some of the proposed rules aimed at enhancing 
transparency indirectly help to prevent inconsistencies. The 
proposed AR 48, which regulates the submission of non-disputing 
parties (NDP), states in its paragraph five, that ³the Tribunal ma\ 
provide the NDP with access to relevant documents filed in the 
 
104 Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals - An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-364 
(2008). 
105 Id. 
106 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, 
Icsid.worldbank.org (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_3_Complete_WP+
Schedules.pdf (last visited Jan 26, 2019), AR 38 and 38 bis. 
107 See article 8.43.1 of CETA. See also article 3.59.1 of the EU ± Vietnam FTA. 
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proceeding, unless either part\ objects.´108 By allowing the 
tribunal to order the production of case documents, the parties 
would better understand case law, focus their arguments more 
precisely, and predict likely outcomes more accurately. The parties 
and their legal counsel would be able to enhance their 
comprehension of similar provisions in other cases. Over time, the 
disclosure of case law documents would be expected to produce 
more predictability and consequently more consistent awards. 
Revision, Annulment and the Trade-off Between Finality and 
Correctness 
Whereas the ICS discussions on addressing the limited 
mechanisms to ensure correctness of awards include establishing 
an appellate tribunal with the competence to review first-instance 
aZards, the ICSID¶s proposed amendment onl\ aims at 
streamlining the rules of procedures governing the interpretation, 
revision, and annulment of awards, as well as codifying ICSID 
practices, in relation to post-award remedy proceedings.109 
A more comprehensive reform aimed at ensuring the 
correctness of tribunal awards, such as the establishment of an 
appellate body in the ICSID framework, has proved very difficult 
in the past. Criticisms of these changes range from a loss of finality 
to the increased cost and duration of ISDS proceedings. Therefore, 
it is expected that a possible outcome of the current reform, in this 
regard, would not include comprehensive changes to the current 
rules. Instead, the proposals unveiled so far show a preference for 
the improvement of existing mechanisms, rather than the creation 
of broader mechanisms for the revision and annulment of 
awards.110 
 
108 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, at 212-13. 
109 See id., at 270. 
110 It is important to emphasize that the ICSID has received several comments on 
this issue during the process of consultation with its Member States and the 
public. A noteworthy opinion from a law firm argues for the necessity of a 
collegial body to scrutinize awards in order to pressure the tribunal to keep the 
quality and timing of awards acceptable. According to the commentators, there 
is a considerable and growing disparity in this regard, which is reinforced by the 
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Addressing Independence and Impartiality While Maintaining 
the Status Quo 
ICSID amendment proposals also envisage addressing the issue 
of independence and impartiality of adjudicators. The proposed 
changes do not abandon the current scheme of party appointment, 
and instead only improve certain provisions that could affect the 
arbitrators¶ independence and impartialit\. The process of 
challenging arbitrators, for example, has been revised, including 
the introduction of an expedited schedule for parties filing a 
challenge, as well as an enhanced declaration of independence and 
impartiality.111 Moreover, ICSID together with UNCITRAL 
Secretarial are working on a Code of Conduct for arbitrators aimed 
at ensuring the consistency of ethical requirements across all the 
major sets of rules used for ISDS.112 Once final, this Code of 
Conduct would be added as an amendment to the ICSID rules. 
Furthermore, the information disclosure requirements from 
arbitrators appointed at the start of a case have been increased. The 
new declaration requires the disclosure of significant relationships 
within the last five years between the appointee and the parties, the 
parties¶ counsel, other members of the tribunal, third-party funders, 
and any involvement in other Investor-State cases, in any 
 
absence of scrutiny during the enforcement stage, as well as a lack of review 
during the annulment stage, which could pressure tribunal members to be more 
attentive to quality. However, such broader suggestions have not been 
incorporated to the proposed rules for amendment thus far. See Public 
Comments to Amendment of ICSID¶s Rules and Regulations, 
Icsid.worldbank.org (2019), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/Public%20Comments%20to%2
0Amendment%20to%20ICSID%20Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf (last 
visited Jan 25, 2019), at 155. 
111 See Backgrounder on Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, 
Icsid.worldbank.org (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Amendment_Backgrounder.pdf (last 
visited Jan 25, 2019). 
112 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Synopsis, 
Icsid.worldbank.org, at 5 (2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Documents/Homepage/Amendments
-Vol_1_Synopsis_EN,FR,SP.pdf (last visited Jan 25, 2019). 
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capacity.113 Those are clearly provisions aimed at reducing the 
chances of double-hatting and will likely prevent conflicts of 
interest during the selection process by providing the parties with 
more complete information on how to instruct a disqualification 
claim. 
The proposed rules, however, do not intend to prohibit double-
hatting, but only to provide more detailed information to assess 
whether a de facto conflict exists.114 Instead, their aim is to 
enhance transparency and enable parties to consider potential 
conflicts of interest derived from double-hatting on a case-by-case 
basis.115  
Transparency of Proceedings 
The current amendment process includes several provisions 
aimed at increasing the transparency of proceedings. The relations 
between parties and third-party funders, which have long been an 
issue of concern in the current system, are further codified to 
introduce an obligation to the parties to disclose whether they have 
third-party funding, along with the source of that funding.116 The 
identity of the funder is required to be disclosed to potential 
arbitrators before their appointment, to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Once more, the proposed rules demonstrate the preference for a 
less dramatic departure from the existing rules, opting for 
 
113 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AR 26.  
114 These options tend to preserve the interest of those individuals who 
frequently act in more than one of such capacities. In its submission to ICSID, 
Derains & Gharavi International, Zhich ³is a netZork bringing together laZ\ers 
who frequently act as arbitrator, counsel and consultant before tribunals´ argues 
that a more restrictive rule in this regard would bring several drawbacks, such as 
reducing the pool of available ICSID arbitrators. Moreover, they argue, the 
arbitrator¶s previous e[perience as counsel is beneficial to the system, as their 
practical experience has great value when facing procedural or substantive 
issues. Furthermore, those arbitrators that act as counsel are less likely to be 
dependent on future appointments and the risks associated therewith. See Public 
Comments to Amendment of ICSID¶s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at 
150.  
115 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, at 361. 
116 See id., AR 21. 
THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AMIDST CRISIS, COLLAPSE, 
AND REFORM 
 52 
enhanced transparency through the mandatory disclosure of 
information, rather than the prohibition of third-party funding. 
The proposed AR 57 aims for a greater participation of non-
disputing parties (NDP). The possibility for NDPs to make written 
submissions has existed in the ICSID rules since 2006. The 
changes, however, incorporate new provisions based on practice 
and experience to date and are meant to further codify NDP 
participation.117  
AR 57(5) would allow the tribunal to order the NDPs to have 
access to relevant documents filed in the proceedings. Nonetheless, 
the parties would still be capable of preventing the NDP from 
accessing any document that they might classify as confidential.118 
The novelties include additional criteria for consideration when 
determining whether to allow written submissions from an NDP, 
such as the identification of its activity or any affiliation with a 
disputing party, and whether the NDP has received any assistance 
with its filing. This will allow the tribunal to better assess whether 
there are any relationships between the NDP and a party.  
The amendments also impose the obligation on the parties to 
inform whether they have third-party funding, the source of the 
funding, as well as the requirement of keeping such disclosures 
updated throughout the proceeding.119 As highlighted above, the 
proposed rules also state that the name of the funder would have to 
be provided to the arbitrators prior to their appointment to avoid 
inadvertent conflicts of interest. Third-party funding is a long-
 
117 Although that can be interpreted as an effort to enhance transparency, it is 
noteworthy that the ICSID has received submissions from organizations linked 
with the arbitration industry suggesting the adoption of tougher rules regarding 
amicus curiae submissions. The European Federation for Investment Law and 
Arbitration (EFILA) suggests including the possibility for the tribunal to request 
that an amicus provide securit\ for the parties¶ reasonable costs in commenting 
on the submission of the amicus as a condition for allowing the amicus to make 
a submission. See Public Comments to Amendment of ICSID¶s Rules and 
Regulations, supra note 108, at 103. 
118 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AR 57 (5). 
119 See id., AR 21.  
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standing concern that is thought to exacerbate pathologies in the 
system by fueling speculative claims, as well as asymmetric 
operation in favor of claimants.120 Despite all the criticism, the 
current amendment process, once more, opts for adopting a remedy 
to its deficiencies rather than a complete prohibition of third-party 
funding. 
The consent of both parties to publish an award would still be 
mandatory under the ICSID Convention²that remains unchanged. 
However, the proposed AR 44(2) states that consent to publish an 
award would be deemed to have been given if a party has not 
objected to it, in writing, within 60 days.121 Even if a party objects, 
the proposed rules would permit the ICSID to publish legal 
excerpts of the award, leaving the requirement undisturbed. 
Therefore, although the proposed rules would remain largely 
similar to the existing ones, transparency would be fostered, as the 
publication of the award would come to be the general rule, rather 
than the exception.122 
Amendments Envisaged to Reduce the Costs of the 
Proceedings 
The ICSID amendments regarding financial provisions also 
reflect the concerns over the increasing costs of ISDS proceedings. 
The proposed rules would modify the current one to entitle 
members to a fixed fee, measured only by hours of work, rather 
than the current method of a flat daily fee irrespective of the 
number of hours worked during the hearings.123 The new rule 
unifies the fee structure, so that all work performed is compensated 
transparently, equally and exactly. Moreover, the proposed rule 
 
120 See Howse, supra note 35. 
121 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AR 44 (2). 
122 Corroborating the view that enhanced transparency can improve the 
development of consistent case laZ, the EFILA contends ³that Zhere ICSID 
Secretariat is prevented from publishing such a decision or order due to lack of 
party consent, it should have the power to publish extracts, if it considers them 
important for the development of international laZ.´ See Public Comments to 
Amendment of ICSID¶s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at 103. 
123 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AFR 7. 
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states that all filings would have to be done electronically, unless 
there are special reasons to maintain paper filing,124 in an attempt 
to make the processes faster and less expensive.125 
Notwithstanding the merits of this modification, its impact on the 
overall cost of the ISDS proceedings would not be significant.126 
Furthermore, requests by tribunal members to be paid more 
than the ICSID fee (currently $3,000/day) are further regulated by 
Administrative Financial Regulation (AFR) 14. The proposed 
amendments would simplify the financial administration of 
proceedings, while ensuring that costs are transparent, predictable, 
and fair.127 It therefore would contribute to keeping the parties¶ 
expenditures under their control. 
AR 19 proposes another modification aimed at reducing the 
costs of proceedings. It encourages tribunals to make cost orders 
on an interim basis and not just in the final award, to keep parties 
cost-conscious during the interlocutory stage and to help parties to 
gauge the ongoing costs of a case.128 As a result it may encourage 
parties to refrain from continuing cases that could give rise to 
further adverse cost orders.129 
New Time Limits to Expedite Cases 
Another major criticism of the ISDS that the current ICSID 
amendment process also addresses is the increasing duration of 
proceedings. The amendment rules set clearer and realistic 
timeframes and implement options for expedited proceedings, 
featuring additional and shortened timelines. The proposed AR 59 
 
124 See id., AR 3 (1). 
125 See Backgrounder on Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, supra 
note 109, at 2. 
126 This is the authors¶ oZn assessment. We assume that merel\ replacing the 
µflat dail\ fee¶ rule to a criterion that measure b\ hours do ver\ feZ to reduce the 
enormous costs with legal counsel. Likewise, by replacing paper filling by 
electronic filling has almost 0 effect on reducing costs. 
127 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AFR 14. 
128 See id., AR 19. 
129 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Synopsis, supra note 
110, at 4. 
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sets clear expectations for tribunal members to render the award in 
a timely manner, while maintaining flexibility, based on individual 
circumstances of each case.130 It revises the current AR 46, which 
deals with the preparation and timing of the award.131 Under the 
current rule, the award must be rendered within 120 days after the 
close of the proceedings. However, since tribunals normally do not 
close the proceedings until the award is almost finalized, this 
provision rarely limits the time for deciding a case.132 
The latest available numbers on ICSID arbitration proceedings 
demonstrate that the average duration, from the registration of the 
case until the rendering of the award, is approximately 
49 months.133 The proposed AR 59 states that awards must be 
rendered within 60 days after the last submission of an application 
for manifest lack of legal merit, 180 days after the last submission 
on a preliminary objection, and 240 days after the last submission 
on all ancillary matters.134  
However, it is important to emphasize that the 240-day limit is 
a ³best-efforts´ obligation under the proposed AR 8(3).135 
Therefore, the amendments seek to ensure that awards be issued 
more expeditiously and under clearer time limits, based on the 
complexity of the case and on the amount of information it has to 
deal with.136 The ICSID received numerous comments from law 
 
130 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, AR 59. 
131 See ICSID Convention, supra note 22, AR 46. 
132 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra 
note 104, at 257. 
133 See id., at 257. 
134 See id., at AR 59. 
135 Proposed AR 8 (3) states that µ¶Where these Rules prescribe time limits for 
orders, decisions and the Award, the Tribunal, or the Chairman, where 
applicable, shall use best efforts to meet those time limits. If special 
circumstances arise which prevent the Tribunal from complying with a time 
limit, it shall advise the parties of the reason for delay and the date when it 
anticipates the order, decision or Award will be delivered.¶¶ Id.  
136 The ICSID¶s option for such la[ language came despite severe criticism 
received during the consultation process. In this sense: µ¶It has become too 
common for extensive time to lapse, sometimes up to two years, between the 
hearing and the rendering of the award and to serve standard excuses, ranging 
from complexity of cases to dissents. In general, it should be made clear that it is 
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firms and arbitration associations during the consultation period. 
Most of the comments conveyed suggestions for normative 
innovations aimed at increasing efficiency and celerity in the 
conclusion of proceedings, which ranged from introduction of 
shorter timeframes137 to best-endeavors provisions.138 The 
interpretation of AR 59, alongside AR 8 (3), nonetheless makes it 
clear that the ICSID has opted for the ³best-endeavors´ language 
when amending its rules. 
The proposed amendment introduced a new chapter with an 
optional expedited arbitration procedure that would significantly 
reduce the timeframes and complexity of proceedings.139 Another 
 
unacceptable to receive awards more than a year after the evidentiary hearing, 
Zhether or not there are post hearing briefs.´ Public Comments to Amendment 
of ICSID¶s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at 152.  
137 ³To increase efficienc\ and celerit\ in the conclusion of proceedings, 
consider introducing the requirement that the proceedings be declared closed 
within a specific time period from the end of the final hearing or the filing of the 
last post-hearing Zritten submissions.´ Id., at 200. Another comment from a law 
firm suggests a rule ³to authori]e the Secretar\-General to reduce the fees of the 
arbitrators where, an award has not been drawn up and signed within the 
specified period of time after closure of the proceedings´. Id., at 200. 
Organi]ations linked Zith the arbitration communit\ proposed that ³ICSID 
considers issuing guidelines for limiting submission length, volume of document 
production, and frivolous applications, and ii) prohibition on more than one 
round of post-hearing submissions.´ Id., at 194. EFILA, in turn, suggests 
³shortening of the deadlines envisaged in the procedure for constituting the 
tribunal in the absence of previous agreement.´ Id., at 102. 
138 ³To encourage time and cost efficiency, consider introducing a rule expressly 
adopting the general principle that the tribunal and the parties shall act in an 
efficient and e[peditious manner´ Id., at 202. The ³practice of informing the 
parties that the arbitrators¶ fees have been reduced due to a delay in the 
rendering of the award is not the correct approach. It undermines the authority of 
the Tribunal in its adjudicatory function. Any process for controlling the delay 
in rendering the award should remain confidential, and overseen by the ICSID 
Secretariat, potentiall\ via the Tribunal¶s secretar\, Zithout opening up the issue 
Zith the Parties to the e[tent possible.´ Id., at 152. 
139 Proposed rules allow the parties to expressly opt into an expedited process for 
the full arbitration within 20 days from the notice of registration. Under the 
Expedited Arbitration, the parties must select arbitrators within 30 days of 
registration and can opt for only one arbitrator or three-person tribunal. Under 
the rules of the expedited process, the first session is held within 30 days. 
Memorials and counter-memorials are each filed in 60 days and limited to 200 
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noteworthy modification aimed at reducing the duration of ISDS 
proceedings is the adoption of an expedited schedule for parties to 
challenge arbitrators. Mentioned as one of the most prominent 
causes for delays in the outcomes of ISDS proceedings, challenges 
to arbitrators are deemed to increase the length of a proceeding by 
65 to 82 percent.140 In order to make this process quicker, the 
proposed AR 29 would introduce an expedited schedule for parties 
to file a challenge.141  
The new rules also require all arguments and supporting 
documents to be included in the disqualification proposal, thus 
transforming what could otherwise be a formally lodged challenge 
into a complete written submission, which reduces the overall time 
needed for the briefing. With the clear intention to minimize 
potential delays in proceedings, the proposed AR 29(3) would 
eliminate the automatic suspension of the proceeding upon the 
 
pages, while replies and rejoinders may each be filed within 40 days and are 
limited to 100 pages. The hearing is held within 60 days after the last written 
submission. The Tribunal can extend the timetable by 30 days to address 
document disclosure motions, if needed. It may also adjust the schedule if 
needed for preliminary objection or ancillary claim, but retaining the expedited 
nature of the process. See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules ² 
Working Paper, supra note 104, AR 69-79. 
140 This statistic comes from research being conducted by Pluricourts. Though it 
is not yet finished, the data was unveiled by the delegate of Pluricourts present 
at the thirty-sixth meeting of UNCITRAL Working Group III, during the session 
that discussed the concerns of cost and duration of ISDS proceedings on 
01\11\2018 during the afternoon. See Malcolm Langford, UNCITRAL WG III 
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) - Speakers Log with Audio 
Recordings (2018), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp (last 
visited Jan 26, 2019). 
141 Under this new schedule, a specific time limit of 20 days for filing a 
disqualification motion replaces the former requirement that it should be filed 
³promptl\.´ The challenge ma\ be proposed an\ time before the aZard is 
rendered, since it is made within 20 days after the date on which the party first 
knew or first should have known of the facts on which the proposal is based. 
The disqualifications proceeding follows with a reply by the responding party 
that is filed in seven days, then arbitrator observation within further five days. 
After that, the parties shall file final observations simultaneously within seven 
days. Finally, the decision is rendered in 30 days. See Proposals for Amendment 
of the ICSID Rules ² Working Paper, supra note 104, AR 29. 
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filing of a challenge.142 It gives the parties the ability to decide 
whether the proceeding will be suspended while the 
disqualification procedure is pending. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The crisis in the ISDS system has reached a stage in which 
most of its users agree that the system urgently requires reform. 
While a consensus exists on this necessity, the regulatory options 
and institutional reforms are still under discussion. So far, three 
options have taken shape and gained relevance in international 
debate. 
The creation of an ICS in the form of a two-tier tribunal, 
composed of permanent and financially independent adjudicators 
with fixed terms, is the most radical departure from the existing 
system and its successful implementation could pose a major threat 
to the ad hoc ISDS. Although this option presents the best way to 
address the most remarkable flaws of the ISDS, it also contains 
several drawbacks in comparison with the current ad hoc system, 
and its implementation presents several practical difficulties.  
The simple creation of an appellate body that would be 
responsible for reviewing the ad hoc tribunals¶ aZards responds to 
only one part of the criticism faced by the ISDS. It neglects other 
serious problems such as the issue of party appointment and its 
effect on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. This 
alternative implies curtailing some of the most heralded advantages 
of the ISDS²namely the celerity of the proceedings and the 
finality of the tribunal awards²but nonetheless leaves the ad hoc 
system unchanged and would thus reduce resistance from the 
arbitration industry. 
Finally, the reform of the current system, represented here by 
the ICSID amendment process, envisages maintaining the status 
quo and making simple cosmetic changes. Arguments in favor of 
maintaining the status quo are that overhead costs that do not 
currently exist would not be created and that it promotes an 
 
142 See id., AR 29 (3). 
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equilibrium between the rights and interests of investors and states, 
as opposed to the ICS proposal, which critics say would eventually 
prevent investors from participating in the composition of 
tribunals. 
The trade-off between the three reform options is clear. All of 
them have advantages and disadvantages, and discussions about 
the most appropriate alternative to solve the current crisis is likely 
to last for years. Nevertheless, discussion on this topic is welcome 
at this time of grave discontent with the current investment dispute 
resolution regime. With multiple ISDS reform initiatives ongoing, 
policymaking in this area is in its most ebullient phase. The next 
developments will demonstrate the measure of success of each 
alternative. The preference of the countries for each model will 
reveal whether any of the three paradigms will prevail or if the 
investment dispute resolution regime will embrace the coexistence 
of more than one paradigm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
